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T he identi cation and control of process hazards is a technical activity linked closely tothe technology of individual manufacturing processes. By consideration of incidentsand assessment procedures it is shown that safety requires ongoing experimental
research.
Examples are given of the use of multi-sponsored projects to fund and support the required
research.
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INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing in many industries (oil, chemical, petro-
chemical, agrochemical, pharmaceutical, paints, food-
stuffs, etc.) involves the processing of one or more of
reactive chemicals,  ammable liquids, vapours, gases and
powders.
A strategy is required that ensures that the industrial
operations are carried out safely. The objective of the
strategy is to establish and maintain safe operations in a
manner that is compatible with the plant design, the
operating conditions, production demands, commercial
requirements and economic factors.
In essence this is the objective of process safety– to
prevent uncontrolled events in industrial operations.
Process safety is not an ‘add-on’ but an integral part of
process development and manufacturing. Furthermore,
the identi cation, evaluation and control of process hazards
is a technical activity linked closely to the technology of
individual manufacturing processes.
It is the thesis of this paper that safety guidelines must
be based on an understanding of the scienti c and technical
principles that control the stability of a process and that
innovative activity– scienti c research– is an essential
part of process safety.
LESSONS FROM INCIDENTS
The use of hindsight– wisdom after the event as it is
de ned in the dictionary– although to some extent an
admission of failure in the process safety  eld, can help to
make safe future operations.
Consideration of the following two incidents indicates
the factors in uencing process safety.
Explosion in a Drying Operation
In 1976 an explosion occurred during the drying of a
water wet powder (3.5 di-nitro ortho toluamide) in a double
cone dryer. Extensive damage was caused to the plant and
buildings.
A Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigation1
concluded that the explosion involved the detonation of
the product which had been left inside a closed dryer vessel
for a period of 24 hours after the drying process had been
completed.
The incident is an example of uncontrolled exothermic
decomposition. This occurs when the rate of heat generated
by the decomposition reaction exceeds the rate of heat
loss from the material. It was considered that the tempera-
ture of the dryer contents would have increased over the
weekend at an ever increasing rate until the product ignited
and burnt to detonation. This manifested itself as an
extremely rapid pressure rise probably to several hundred
bar in the shock wave. The rupture of the dryer probably
occurred at a pressure of about 50 bar g.
When materials are subjected to heat or a chemical
reaction is exothermic, establishment of a safe process
requires a knowledge of the minimum temperature at
which uncontrolled exothermic activity could be initiated.
Determination of this temperature requires an understand-
ing of the heat generation and the heat loss mechanism in
the manufacturing operation.
The stability of this product had been determined using
Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA) and this indicated
an onset temperature of 274°C to 284°C. These temperatures
were well above the drying temperature of 130°C to 140°C.
However, the sample in DTA is small (milligrammes) and
the temperature detection requires heat to  ow from the
sample to the detector. The mass of product in the dryer
was about 1300kg so heat loss rate was signi cantly less
than in the DTA equipment. The dryer produced a near
adiabatic situation.
Research into chemical reaction hazards has led to the
development of two techniques that simulate adiabatic
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conditions: the ARC adiabatic calorimeter2 developed by
Dow and a test cell based on Dewar vessels that simulated
the heat  ow characteristics of chemical reactors3 developed
by ICI.
The development of both techniques has involved
considerable research effort but its value can be seen by
the fact that the techniques indicated onset temperatures of
115°C to 125°C for this material.
Electrostatic Ignition of a Dust Cloud
This incident occurred during the simple operation of
loading powder down a chute into a chemical reactor. The
operation had been carried out for many years when,
withoutwarning, a dust explosion occurred in the feed chute
and the operator was fatally injured.
The powder being loaded down the chute was anthra-
quinone, and the contents of the reactor were sulphuric
acid. Thus the only  ammable atmosphere was a dust cloud
of anthraquinone. Static electricity was identi ed as the
cause of the explosion.
The incident was caused by:
· Electrostatic charge being generated on the powder as it
 owed over the surface of the chute.
· Initially the chute was fabricated from metal and earthed;
this safely dissipated the static electricity. To aid powder
 ow, the metal chute was replaced by a rubberized chute
with a metal spiral support.
· The non-conducting rubber accumulated electrostatic
charge, transferred it to the metal spiral insulated from
earth and this released incendive discharges.
· A dust cloud of anthraquinone was found to have a low
Minimum Spark Ignition Energy (<5mJ) and to be sensitive
to ignition by electrostatic discharges.
The incident highlighted that dust clouds can have
minimum ignition energies approaching those of solvents.
Research has been carried out in the UK and mainland
Europe to establish the electrostatic ignition risk with
dust clouds4. Studies of the incendivity of different kinds
of electrostatic discharges are ongoing in order to control
the electrostatic hazard associated with the ever increasing
use of plastics in industry.
Incidents normally occur due to the interaction of a
number of factors. In general terms these are:
(1) Lack of knowledge of the potential risk.
(2) Failure to recognize the risk in a situation.
(3) Failure to specify safety measures.
(4) Failure to apply safety measures.
Factor (1) and to some extent factor (2) require technical
information. In an ever changing world, research is required
to ensure potential risk in new situations can be recognized
and controlled.
PROCESS SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The essential stages of a process safety assessment are
shown in Figure 1.
Process and plant designers or users are responsible
for the initiation, implementation and monitoring stages.
This paper is concerned with the evaluation stage. Up-to-
date technical information is required to evaluate sources
of hazard and to specify the most appropriate safety
measures. Both cover a wide technical canvas.
In the chemical and allied industries, for example,
identi cation of chemical reaction hazards involves:
· Identi cation of detonation/de agration that precludes
manufacture in standard chemical plants.
· Early identi cation of the possibility of exothermic
reaction and guidance as to temperatures at which it could
become uncontrolled.
· Data on the rate and magnitude of exothermic reactions
and gas evolution under full-scale conditions.
· Sensitivity of the ‘normal’ process to changes in process/
operating conditions.
Safe operation can be based on:
· Process control preventing conditions being attained
under which uncontrolled exothermic reaction will be
initiated; or
· Process control to minimize the probability of a runaway
reaction combined with protective measures should such
a reaction occur. The options for protective measures are:
· Process control+ containment.
· Process control+ reactor venting.
· Process control+ crash cooling/drown-out.
· Process control+ reaction inhibition.
The most appropriate safety measure depends on process
details– including toxicity of products, magnitude and rate
of the runaway parameters and the practicality of imple-
menting and maintaining the safety measures.
Critical technical considerations for each are:
Process Control
· De nition of minimum temperature at which uncon-
trolled exotherm will start under plant conditions.
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Figure 1. Assessment procedure.
· Safety margin between operating temperatures and
exotherm temperature.
· Monitoring and control systems to maintain temperature
in the safe region.
· Maintenance of temperature should agitation or cooling
fail– for example, stop feed reactant, use solvent that boils
at safe temperature.
· Control sources of risk external to process– for example,
addition of wrong materials.
· Speci cation of lower temperature limit to prevent
accumulation.
· Consequences on two-phase systems of agitation failure.
Process Control and Reactor Venting
· De nition of worst case– that is, conditions leading to
maximum rate of exothermic activity.
· Establishment of ‘kinetics’ of the runaway reaction.
· Nature of discharge material– gas, liquids, solids.
· Methods for calculating reactor vent area and discharge
system for the vented materials.
· Safe discharge area–  ammable and toxic hazards–
dump tanks.
Process Control and Crash Cooling/Drown-Out
· Rate of temperature rise/heat generation after runaway
detected.
· Time to hazardous pressure.
· Availability of compatible cooling medium.
· Relative thermal capacities of reaction mass and cooling
medium.
· Plant design/operation to intermix reaction mass and
cooling medium and stop the temperature rising before
maximum permissible pressure is attained.
Process Control and Reaction Inhibition
· Availability of compatible reaction inhibitor.
· Time to hazardous pressure.
· Inhibitor ef ciency.
· Plant design and operation to intermix reaction mass
and inhibitor and stop the temperature rising before
maximum permissible pressure is attained.
In addition to the control of chemical reaction hazards,
consideration has also to be given to the  re and explosion
risk associated with the processing of  ammable gases,
vapours, liquids and powders.
To eliminate such hazards each stage of manufacture
must be considered in terms of:
· Identi cation and characterization of  ammable mate-
rials.
· Identi cation of potential ignition sources.
· Selection, design and installation of the most appropriate
safety measures.
In identifying and characterizing  ammable materials
consideration has to be given to (1) presence of  amm-
able atmosphere, (2) sensitivity to ignition of the  ammable
atmosphere and (3) the potential violence of any  re or
explosion.
Consideration of ignition sources in a speci c process/
plant is concerned with auto-ignition, mechanical friction,
thermite reaction, static electricity, spontaneous combus-
tion, thermal decomposition, pyrophoric catalysts and any
other ignition sources intrinsic to the process and plant
operation.
Once the ignition risk has been established, attention
has to turn to safety measures. These can be one or more
of the following:
· Avoidance of  ammable atmosphere. Use of inert gas or
operating outside the  ammability limits.
· Avoidance of all ignition sources.
· Containment of  re and explosion.
· Explosion venting.
· Explosion suppression.
Critical technical considerations for each are:
Avoidance of Flammable Atmospheres
· Can fuel concentrations be maintained outside  amm-
ability limits at all times including start-up and shutdown?
· Is the material dependent on atmospheric oxygen for
combustion and/or decomposition?
· Can the system be sealed to prevent ingress of air?
· Can ingress of air be avoided when reactants are added–
for example, air entrained in powders?
Avoidance of All Ignition Sources
· Can all ignition sources be identi ed?
· Is the sensitivity to ignition by these sources known for
all the materials in the process?
· Can all ignition sources be eliminated under normal and
abnormal conditions?
Containment of Explosion/Decomposition
· Can the maximum pressure developed in explosion/
decomposition be predicted?
· Can all interconnected components withstand the maxi-
mum pressure?
· Can the system be mechanically separated into discrete
volumes to prevent pressure piling?
· Can the system be sealed at high pressures?
· Can process operations (for example, addition of powder,
sampling) be carried out with a pressure-sealed system?
Explosion Venting
· Can maximum rates of pressure rise under process
conditions be established?
· Can adequate relief areas be provided relevant to process
conditions?
· Can a safe discharge area be provided for  ammable/
toxic products?
Explosion Suppression
· Is pressure arising from combustion the sole source of
pressure? Suppressant systems cannot control pressure
resulting from gas evolution.
· Are the combustion characteristics of the process
materials such that the suppressant can effectively stop
 ame propagation?
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· Are the suppressant chemicals compatible with the
process chemicals?
In all the above areas the technical input is critical to the
reaching of correct decisions with respect to both assess-
ment of risk and speci cation of effective safety measures.
Process safety assessment requires both good, up-to-date
and well researched technical information and the proce-
dures to apply it. Both are important.
In the past, research in the  eld of process safety was
carried out in both industry and academia. In recent years,
whilst papers in hazard assessment procedures continue to
proliferate, the publication of scienti c or technical papers
is in rapid decline.
Every two to three years the North Western Branch of
the Institution of Chemical Engineers organizes a major
conference on process safety that has enjoyed UK and
overseas input since the 1960s.
Up to the end of the 1980s, about 60% to 90% of the
papers were concernedwith scienti c research and technical
innovation. In the 1990s this has declined to less than 25%,
with the greater proportion of papers being concerned with
regulatory or procedural matters.
In the commercial conference  eld the attendance at
scienti cally orientated meetings has dropped from 100–
120 to 30–40 people whilst the non-scientic meetings
continue to maintain their numbers.
Following a major incident, Trevor Kletz5 stated that,
‘putting too much trust in systems is a common failing
today. There is an epidemic of papers and books on safety
management but they are no substitute for knowledge and
experience. All they can do is to ensure that knowledge
and experience are applied in a systematic and ef cient
way.’
The knowledge that we use must be up to date. New
manufacturing processes must be developed, and existing
ones improved, for industry to survive. As with the other
aspects of process development and plant design, innovative
activity must be an essential part of process safety.
PROCESS SAFETY RESEARCH– A PATTERN
FOR THE FUTURE?
The dearth of papers on technical process safety re ects
a real reduction in scienti c experimental research on this
topic both in industry and academia.
An area of concern to industry is the control of dust
explosions.About 75% of all powders processed in industry
are combustible and if dispersed into a dust cloud and
ignited they will explode in a manner akin to vapour clouds.
Dust explosions are not a new phenomenon. In 1795 a
Count Morozzo described6 an explosion in a  our ware-
house and ‘added some observations on spontaneous
in ammations’. The ignition source in this case was the
 ame of a lamp.
In August 1998 a major grain explosion occurred at
Blaye, France. A silo installationwas badly damaged and 11
people killed. The source of ignition is considered to be
mechanical impacts or friction in the fan or an incipient  re
due to auto-heating in the dust store.
In the years between these incidents, dust explosions
have continued to occur. Statistics, albeit not the most
comprehensive, suggest that the frequency of explosions
is one a week in the UK and one a day in continental Europe.
In the late 1980s it was generally recognized in Europe
that our scienti c understanding of dust explosion phenom-
ena and means of controlling them were far from complete,
and that there was a need for research and development,
not only to minimize the possibility of industrial dust
explosions, but also to control the consequences of those
that occur.
Dust explosion research requires large-scale test facili-
ties of high cost. Individual organizations were reluctant
to provide the necessary  nance, and important problem
areas were not currently the subject of research.
Furthermore, industry-based research in this  eld tends
to be short term in its objectives and aims to provide
explosion protection for existing operations or those under
immediate development. This approach tends to lead to
safety measures that are ‘added’ to the plant and not
to general information that can be used to modify processes
and plants in a manner that leads to more intrinsically
safe plants, in which safety measures are an integral part
and not an ‘add-on’ feature.
It was considered that research was required that
would change our knowledge base from one derived from
limited empirical experimentation, to one that can be used
to identify potential problems and prescribe measures to
eliminate or control dust explosion hazards in a more
fundamental and widely applicable manner.
In 1991, under the aegis of the British Materials
Handling Board and funded by the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), Department of the Environment (DoE)
and Health and Safety Executive (HSE), a Europe-wide
survey was carried out to determine the views of industry
and academia on the research topics worthy of further
study. Some 27 topics were identi ed and these were
co-ordinated into research programmes. Application was
made to the EC Environment Programme and funds
obtained for work on eight topics. The organizations
involved and the outcome of the research are summarized
below:
(1) Measurement of Dust Cloud Characteristics in Indus-
trial Plants (FSA, Germany).
The objective was to provide techniques with which
industry can characterize the dust clouds in their powder
handling operations.
(2) Detection and Extinction of Fire and Smouldering in
Bulk Powder (Zeneca, UK).
Smouldering powder is a common ignition source in
dust explosions. This research enabled powders to be
characterized in terms of their sensitivity to smouldering
initiation.
(3) Measurement of the Fundamental Burning Velocity
of Dust-Air Mixtures in Industrial Situations (Christian
Michelsen Research, Norway).
Data were obtained that aid the development of models for
vented dust explosions.
(4) Investigation of Flame Structure During Laminar and
Turbulent Burning in Dust Air Mixtures (University of
Warsaw, ITC, Poland).
An understanding of combustion processes in dust clouds
was obtained that assists in the development of predictive
models.
(5) Modelling of Pressure Blast Effects and Fireball
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Sizes from Vented Dust Explosions (Christian Michelsen
Research, Norway).
Developed the FLACS combustionmodel to apply it to dust
explosions.
(6) Measurements of Pressure Blast Effects and Fireball
Sizes from Vented Duct Explosions (Battelle, Germany).
Explosions in vented 1m3 and 25m3 vessels were used to
provide data on the distribution of  ame and pressure
outside explosion vents.
(7) Measurement of Pressure Blast Effects and Fireball
Sizes from Vented Dust Explosions in Rooms (IBExU,
Germany).
A large-scale explosion room (424m3) was used to provide
data on pressure and  ame distribution outside large scale
vents.
(8) Development of Validated Predictive Methods for
Response of Buildings and Structures Subjected to Vented
Dust Explosions (Fire Research Station, UK).
This project co-ordinated all the pressure/ ame distribution
data and de ned methods for prescribing safe discharge
areas around explosion vents.
This approach to research offers not only economic but
also scienti c advantages. The project brought together
industrial and academic scientists of different disciplines
and with varying experience.
The project has been a success; it not only produced
valuable results itself but also stimulated ongoing research
in the participating countries.
In the UK, research on dust explosion phenomena, funded
and controlled by HSE and industrial companies, is being
continued at the Health and Safety Laboratory, Buxton.
Another example of a multinational approach to process
safety research is the DIERS project in which European
and American scientists from academia and industry are
studying the design of reactor relief systems to control
runaway reactions.
The approach adopted in these projects can be used to
initiate research on other process safety topics.
CONCLUSIONS
Safety guidelines that are not based on an under-
standing of the technical and scienti c principles that
control the stability of a process are built on foundations
of sand.
Both academia and industry react to incidents and initiate
scienti c programmes but, unlike in the past, proactive
initiation of experimental research is declining.
Process safety research, particularly experimental work,
can be expensive in terms of effort and  nancial costs.
David Bull in the 1995 Vernon Clancey Memorial Lecture
quoted Trevor Kletz and I can do no better than reiterate
the quotation, ‘If you think hazards research is expensive,
try accidents.’
There is a way ahead. It involves reaching a consensus
as to the topics worthy of research and then developing
programmes that attract  nancial support from industry,
government bodies and the EU.
Is process safety research good value in terms of avoiding
injury to personnel, damage to plant, and cost reduction?
Is it a coincidence that a major chemical company that
based its process safety activity in its Research Department
has not had an uncontrolled incident since this was done?–
over 20 years ago! Can we afford not to do research?
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